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Abstract: In this study, an assessment of the impact of Basel II capital requirement 
rules driven by credit risk of non-financial firms is performed. Intervals of variation for 
the risk drivers are established such that capital requirements for firms' credit risk 
under Basel II exceed capital requirements under Basel I. Moreover, a characterization 
of the Portuguese Banking system, which includes a description of corporate credit and 
its associated probabilities of default, and the computation of capital requirements are 
performed. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Capital requirements for banks are of foremost importance for financial stability in the 
sense that they are intended to minimise the probability of bank failure at reasonable 
cost. In fact, past episodes of widespread bank insolvency turned out to be very costly 
in terms of taxpayers’ money and highly disruptive to the real economy reflected, for 
example, in output losses and steep rises in unemployment. The role of capital 
requirements works at least in two ways: it provides a loss absorbing cushion for 
unexpected events and, if properly designed, introduces incentives for banks to limit 
the risk of their activities. Actually, given that capital, and in particular equity, is the 
most expensive source of banks’ funding, capital requirements have an impact on the 
return on equity while potentially influencing the competitive stance in the financial 
sector. Against this background and given growing international capital mobility, 
global harmonization of prudential supervision, ensuring a level playing field among 
banks in different countries, is crucial. The 1988 Basel Accord (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (1988)) was the beginning of the convergence of the rather 
different approaches that countries adopted. In June 2004 a revision of this framework, 
commonly denominated Basel II, was published by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006b)). These new rules were 
then laid down in EU legislation and subsequently transposed into Portuguese national 
law, coming into force in 2007.
2  
 
Basel II is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars. Pillar I presents capital 
requirements for credit, market and operational risk, introducing the main innovations 
of this revision. One of the innovations concerns the use of credit ratings (either 
internal or external) for the assessment of capital requirements, which become sensitive 
to the credit quality of each specific exposure, not relying solely on credit type. In this 
sense, capital requirements became dependent on the quality of credit, inferred from 
estimates of risk drivers such as the probability of default and the loss given default. 
Additionally, the volume of corporate sales and the maturity of credit may also be 
relevant for evaluating capital requirements. Another important innovation is that 
banks are required to hold capital for operational risk. Pillar II concerns the supervision 
of banks. Banking supervisors are given more authority to evaluate the consistency and 
                                                  
2 Given that the adoption of the new framework was optional in 2007, it was implemented by 
the majority of the Portuguese banks only in 2008.    3
robustness of banks’ internal risk assessment methodologies. Finally, Pillar III 
introduces rules on the information banks are required to publish. This pillar is also 
called the market discipline pillar. 
 
The relation between capital requirements and credit quality established under Basel II 
is believed to have an economic pro-cyclical effect.
3 The idea is that when the economy 
is on the down side of the cycle credit risk measures tend to increase, resulting in 
higher capital requirements. As it tends to be difficult to raise capital in downturns, 
banks may be forced to reduce their lending activities, thus exacerbating shocks in the 
real economy. There may also be other negative shocks reflected in their capital base. 
In this context, an assessment of the capital requirement for the European banking 
system is of extreme importance, as European firms rely heavily on bank financing. 
This is the case of Portugal as, in December 2007, corporate loans represented more 
than 80% of total corporate debt, defined by the sum of bank loans granted to and 
bonds issued by the corporate sector. The importance of banks as a source of financing 
is even higher if commercial paper in banks’ portfolios is also taken into account 
alongside loans granted, as the sum of these two financial instruments held by banks 
represents more than 85% of total corporate debt. 
 
In this study, an assessment is made of the impact of Basel II rules regarding capital 
requirements by credit risk of non-financial firms. Intervals of variation for the above 
mentioned risk drivers are established such that capital requirements for firms’ credit 
risk under Basel II exceed capital requirements under Basel I. Moreover, for the 
Portuguese banking system in 2007 we conclude that, if the observed default rate is 
used as a proxy for the probability of default, under Basel II capital requirements for 
exposures larger than one million euros to small and medium sized firms are generally 
higher than the ones assessed under Basel I. Capital requirements for exposures to large 
firms are similar to those for exposures smaller than one million euros to small and 
medium sized firms, being these classes the ones that exhibit the smallest capital 
requirements. For the Portuguese banking system, capital requirements being higher or 
lower than what is stipulated under Basel I is highly dependent on the assumed loss 
given default. In particular, using estimates of the loss given default in previous studies 
of Portuguese banks (always smaller than 52%) capital requirements for credit risk of 
non-financial firms are in general less than what is required under Basel I. Nevertheless, 
                                                  
3 Benford and Nier (2007), Heid (2007) and Kashyap and Stein (2004), among many others, 
discuss the cyclicality impacts of Basel II using quite different approaches.   4
results should be interpreted with caution because the sample used is biased towards 
borrowers with better credit risk assessment, due to the lack of information on a subset 
of borrowers with higher than average credit risk. 
 
This study is restricted to the analysis of credit risk of non-financial firms, and does not 
look at credit risk associated with other loans, at market risk and at operational risk. 
Capital requirements are expected to decrease if credit risk associated with other loans 
is considered, as the majority of these other loans are mortgage loans which 
traditionally have lower values for the probability of default and the loss given default. 
However, capital requirements would be higher if operational risk is considered as, 
according to the Banco de Portugal (2008), in June 2008, the capital charge for 
operational risk accounted for 7% of overall capital requirements. Nevertheless, the 
overall analysis is representative as loans to non-financial firms represent about 45% of 
total loans granted by the Portuguese financial system to the non-financial private 
sector (non-financial firms and households) and considers the risk component with 
higher relevance in capital requirements. 
 
The conclusions of this study are in line with studies carried out in other countries, 
despite the fact that our data captures the recent decline in the firms’ financial 
standing. Using information for Spanish firms along the period 1994-2001, Saurina and 
Trucharte (2004) conclude that capital requirements driven by firms’ credit risk would 
be 7.27%, versus 8% under Basel I. Fabi, Laviola, and Reedtz (2005) use data on 
Italian firms for 2002, and conclude that overall capital requirements for firms’ credit 
risk would be equal to 5.8%. The Results of the Fifth Quantitative Impact Study 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006a)), undertaken between October and 
December 2005 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on 31 countries,
4 show 
that minimum required capital for credit risk under Basel II would decrease relative to 
the Basel I Accord. Although the portfolio of credits to firms implies a decrease in 
minimum required capital, the main driver of this result is the mortgage portfolio, 
which is not analysed here.  
 
This work is organized as follows. In section 2, a description of capital requirements for 
corporate sector credit risk is presented and compared with the situation under Basel I. 
In section 3, using data from the Portuguese banking system, a characterization of the 
                                                  
4 The Fifth Quantitative Impact Study was performed on G10 countries, except the US, and 
other non-G10 countries including Portugal.    5
loans to firms and their rates of default is presented. In section 4, an evaluation of 
capital requirements for the Portuguese banking system is given. Finally, section 5 
presents the main conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Capital Requirements for Credit Risk 
 
This section discusses the Basel II framework in respect to capital requirements for 
credit risk in non-financial firms. It starts by briefly recalling the fundamentals of the 
Basel II Accord and provides a general overview of the computation of capital 
requirements for credit risk. The second part of this section presents a comparison of 
capital requirements under Basel I and Basel II for firms’ credit risk as a function of 
the risk components underlying the Basel II setting.  
 
2.1. Overview of capital requirements within the Basel II framework  
 
The final version of the Basel II Accord, dated June 2004, is the result of a long process 
characterized by an intense dialogue between the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, called here the Committee, the banking industry and national regulators. 
The Committee released several proposals for consultation and also conducted several 
quantitative impact studies on its proposals, aimed at measuring the impact of the new 
rules. The final version of the text came out of this dialogue with considerable 
improvements. 
 
The development process of this new framework started in 1996 as capital requirements 
for market risk were first introduced in the Basel I Accord (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (1996)). In its initial stage, three complementary pillars were 
established. The first one, on minimum capital requirements, aims to establish a better 
correspondence between regulatory capital and economic risk of exposures. It also 
introduces the need of minimum capital requirements for operational risk. The second 
pillar, on the supervisory review process, intends to ensure that banks have adequate 
capital to support the risk in their business, giving supervisors the role of evaluating if 
banks are assessing well their capital needs. The third pillar, on market discipline, 
develops a set of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess 
the capital adequacy of institutions. In later stages, the Committee announced a 
formula for calculating capital charges, as a function of credit risk measures. The   6
initially single formula proposed by the Committee introduced more risk sensitiveness 
to the computation of risk weighted assets, but it was found to be suboptimal. In the 
final version of the Basel II capital rules, the main risk function is adjusted to each 
portfolio of exposures resulting in a different treatment in terms of capital 
requirements, across segments of credit. Finally, with respect to the treatment of credit 
losses, initial proposals called for banks to hold enough capital to absorb expected and 
unexpected credit losses. However, the final version of the Accord adopts an approach 
based solely on unexpected losses, while banks are expected to provision expected 
losses.  
 
The Basel II Accord retains key elements of the Basel I Accord, among them the basic 
structure of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment regarding the treatment of market risk 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996)), the definition of eligible capital and 
the general requirement for banks to hold total capital equivalent to at least 8% of 
their total risk-weighted assets. Hence, under Basel II, as under Basel I, the eligible 





Total Risk Weighted Assets . 
 
While the definition of eligible capital was almost kept unchanged from Basel I to Basel 
II, the calculation of the total risk-weighted assets has been significantly changed. The 
total risk-weighted assets are the sum of the risk-weighted assets for credit risk and a 
12.5 multiple of capital requirements for market risk and operational risk.
5 As far as 
credit risk is concerned, the risk-weighted assets are computed by applying a weight to 
each exposure. This weight is the value of a function provided by the Committee 
(hereafter denoted risk weight function), where the inputs of this function are the risk 
drivers of each exposure. The weight dependence on the risk drivers is a major 
difference to the previous regulation, as under Basel I, the weights to be applied were 
set for very broad categories of credit risk. The weights used were 0, 10, 20, 50 and 
100%. As an illustration, corporate credit used to be weighted at 100% for all 
exposures, a situation that was widely recognized as not reflecting the heterogeneity of 
risks within the portfolio of corporate credit.  
                                                  
5 In this sense capital requirements are the sum of three components: 8% of the risk-weighted 
assets for credit risk, capital requirements for market risk and capital requirements for 
operational risk.   7
 
One of the motivations for the revision of the Basel I Accord was the insufficient risk 
sensitivity in the calculation of risk-weighted assets. Since the first proposals, there was 
a clear intention to replace the “one-size-fits-all” framework of the Basel I Accord with 
a variety of options. Hence, according to the final version of the Basel II Accord, banks 
may decide between two broad methodologies to compute the risk-weighted assets: the 
Standardized approach and the Internal Ratings-based (IRB) approach.
6 These 
approaches differ in two main respects. First, the Standardized approach is based on 
external risk assessments produced by rating agencies while the IRB approach is based 
on banks’ internal credit risk systems. Second, under the Standardized approach, risk 
weights are set by the Committee as a function of the external rating and take only 
discrete values (very similar to Basel I). Under the Internal Ratings-based approach, 
risk weights are obtained by applying the risk weight function defined by the 
Committee that gives rise to a range of values for risk weights. Although banks may 
decide on which methodology to use, they may have an incentive to use the more 
sophisticated ones, as they should reflect more accurately the risk of the credit 
exposure. Once a bank adopts the IRB approach for part of its credits
7, as it is 
acceptable that it may not be practicable to implement it all at once, it is expected 
that this approach would be gradually implemented across all other credits. Moreover, 
once a more advanced approach is adopted, a voluntary return to less sophisticated 
approaches must be approved by the supervisor. 
 
To implement the IRB approach, banks should categorize credits into broad classes of 
assets with different underlying risk characteristics. The classes of assets are corporate, 
sovereign, banks, retail and equity. Although there is a class denoted corporate, some 
exposures to firms are not classified here. In its final version, the Accord distinguishes 
between exposures to small and medium sized firms (which are defined as firms with 
annual sales lower than 50 million euros) and exposures to larger firms. Exposures to 
small and medium sized firms (SMEs) are categorized either in the retail class (if the 
size of the exposure is smaller than 1 million euros) or in the corporate class, while 
exposures to larger firms are always categorized in the corporate class. Nonetheless, it 
should be stressed that the regulatory treatment of SMEs classified as corporate 
departs from the one applied to larger firms, according to their level of sales. 
                                                  
6 The IRB methodology has to be validated by the national supervision authority. 
7 The first authorization for the use of the IRB approach requires that more than 50% of the 
credits are considered and among the classes considered almost all the credit must be included.   8
 
For each class of assets, the risk-weighted assets for credit risk result from the 
internally estimated risk parameters and the risk weight functions
8 supplied by the 
Committee. Regarding the risk weight function, the Accord provides two different 
versions: one for sovereign, corporate and bank exposures and another one for retail 
exposures. For the first, this function is 
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S is a function of annual sales of the firm concerned (expressed in millions of euros), M 
is the maturity of the exposure (expressed in years), b is defined as 
[ ] =−
2 ( ) 0.11852 0.05478ln( ) bP D P D , N denotes the standard normal cumulative 
distribution, NI denotes the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution, PD 
is the probability of default and LGD is the loss given default. The function S equals 
annual sales in millions of euros if annual sales are between 5 and 50 million euros, it 
equals 5 if annual sales are smaller than or equal to 5 million euros and it equals 50 if 
annual sales are higher than or equal to 50 million euros. The sales adjustment 
(corresponding to the third term on the R definition) applies only to corporate 
exposures. 
 
Capital requirements are positively related w i t h  P D ,  L G D ,  M  a n d  R .  T h e  p o s i t i v e  
relationship of capital requirements on M is dependent on the loss given default and on 
the level of sales. In fact, a change in the maturity of the credit has a higher impact on 
capital requirements for higher values of S and LGD. Notice that R is the correlation 
coefficient representing the degree of co movement in credit risk of all exposures in the 
portfolio. This coefficient is derived from the asymptotic risk factor model underlying 
                                                  
8 The source of these functions is the conditional VAR. The IRB approach of Basel II to 
determining how much capital a bank should hold focuses on the probability of bank 
insolvencies arising from credit losses that supervisors are willing to accept. In their lending 
activity, banks know that there are always some borrowers that default on their credits. The 
expected part of credit losses should be covered by provisions, while the unexpected losses 
should be covered by capital. For this reason, the minimum capital requirement is set to ensure 
that unexpected losses exceeds the level of capital with a probability of 0.1%, which is set as the 
probability of bank insolvency under Basel II.   9
capital requirements under Basel II. Finally, the factor 1.06 is an ad-hoc adjustment 
introduced in 2004 by the Basel Committee. The Committee had a goal with the 
adoption of the Basel II capital rules of neither significantly decreasing nor increasing 
the aggregate level of regulatory capital in the banking system. However, the minimum 
required capital resulting from the changes occurred between the third consultative 
paper (mid-2003) and the final text of the Accord decreased. Subsequently, the 
Committee decided to introduce a scaling factor of 1.06 to offset the mentioned 
decrease in capital requirements
9. 
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Although our study concerns firms, this risk function is relevant as exposures lower 
than one million euros to SMEs will be classified as retail. In this case capital 
requirements are not dependent on the maturity of the credit as well as on the level of 
annual sales. The correlation (R), which is not dependent on the level of annual sales, 
proves to be smaller than the one for corporate exposures. The rationale behind this 
differentiated treatment to small business is that the default risk of smaller firms is 
assumed to be mostly idiosyncratic, implying a smaller correlation when compared to 
larger firms. Additionally, for the same increase in the level of PD the correlation 
exhibits a smaller decrease than in the case of the corporate exposure.  
 
Regarding the estimation of the risk parameters, the Committee made two approaches 
available: the Foundation approach and the Advanced approach. Under the Foundation 
approach, banks are required to use their own estimate of the probability of default and 
rely on supervisory estimates for all other risk parameters. Under the Advanced 
approach, banks must use their own estimates for the PD, the loss given default, the 
exposure at default (EAD) and the effective maturity. These two approaches apply to 
                                                  
9 Later, in May 2006, the committee decided to keep the 1.06 scaling factor unchanged, although 
the results from the fourth and fifth quantitative impact studies would suggest an update of this 
figure.   10
all credit classes with the exception of retail exposures. For retail exposures banks need 
to provide estimates of all risk parameters, implying that for this type of exposures 
only the IRB Advanced approach can be used.  
 
2.2. A comparison between Basel I and Basel II capital requirements  
 
The focus of this study is the risk weight function, since it provides the risk-weighted 
assets and therefore the capital requirements.
10 In what follows we will establish regions 
for the PD and LGD such that Basel II capital requirements for firms’ credit risk are 
higher than the ones established under Basel I. Moreover, we also proceed with a 
comparison of capital requirements if a given credit is considered retail or corporate, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
In order to establish regions for LGD, we consider it to take values in the region 
between 45% and 75%. These limits, although somewhat arbitrary, were benchmarks 
established by the Committee under the Foundation approach, given that for senior 
claims on corporates, not secured by recognised collateral, an LGD level of 45% was 




In Figure 1 we establish regions for the parameters PD and LGD such that Basel I is 
more demanding than Basel II, and vice versa. We consider capital requirements for 
exposures to firms classified under the retail class, hereafter denoted retail for 
simplification, and for exposures to firms classified as corporate. For the corporate class 
a maturity of 0.5 and a level of annual sales smaller than or equal to 5 million euros 
were considered. In general, for very high (small) values of the LGD and PD capital 
requirements under Basel II are higher (smaller) than capital requirements under Basel 
I. For the values of PD and LGD in the grey area capital requirements under Basel II 
are higher than capital requirements under Basel I, for both classes of credit. The 
dashed area identifies the values of PD and LGD such that Basel II results in higher 
capital requirements for the corporate class but not for the retail class. Finally, the 
                                                  
10 The comparison of capital requirements under Basel I and Basel II collapses in comparing K 
(as defined in equations (1) and (2)) with 8%. Under Basel I, as the corporate credit used to be 
weighted at 100% the minimum capital held is RWA
I×8% = EAD×8%. Under Basel II, the risk 
weighted-assets for credit risk are given by  = ×× 12.5 RWA K EAD , where K is supplied by the 
Committee. Therefore, under Basel II, minimum capital held for firms credit risk becomes 
RWA
II×8% = K×12.5×EAD×8% = K×EAD.  
11 These levels of LGD can be adjusted on the presence of eligible collateral.   11
striped area identifies the set of PD and LGD values such that capital requirements 
under Basel II are smaller, for both types of classes. In conclusion it should be stressed 
that although a comparison of capital requirements under Basel II and Basel I for the 
corporate class is highly dependent on the estimates of the relevant risk parameters, the 
same does not hold if credit is categorized as retail. In fact, for values of PD and LGD 
presented in the literature
12 banks set capital requirements smaller than the ones under 
Basel I.  
 
Figure 1 
Comparing capital requirements under Basel I (K
I) and Basel II (K
II) for exposures to 


















































Notes: The corporate class is assumed to have a maturity of 0.5 years and annual sales smaller 
then or equal to 5 million euros.  
 
A complementary analysis is presented in Figure 2 where we establish regions for the 
parameters PD and LGD such that Basel I is more demanding than Basel II, and vice 
versa, for the corporate class as a function of firm sales and the maturity of exposures.  
On the left-hand side we consider firms with annual sales smaller than or equal to 5 
million euros, while on the right-hand side we consider firms with annual sales higher 
than or equal to 50 million euros. The set of values for PD and LGD leading to higher 
minimum capital requirements under Basel II becomes larger with the maturity of the 
credit. As credits with longer maturities tend to be riskier, the enlargement of this set 
is in line with the Basel II purposes that capital requirements should reflect risk.  
 
                                                  
12 See, for instance, Tarashev and Zhu (2007), Fernandes (2006), Antunes (2005), Jacobson, 
Lindé and Roszbach (2005), Saurina and Trucharte (2004), Dietsch and Petey (2004).   12
For the values of PD and LGD in the grey area the minimum capital requirements 
under Basel II are higher than the minimum capital requirements under Basel I, for all 
the maturities being considered. For combinations of PD and LGD belonging to the 
dashed areas, the minimum capital requirements under Basel II are higher if the 
maturity of the credit is equal to 5 years and smaller if the maturity is 0.5 years. 
Hence, two credits with the same PD and LGD will have different minimum capital 
requirements depending on their maturity. In this specific case, if a credit with a 
maturity of 5 years is considered, the resulting minimum capital requirement will be 
higher than 8%, while if a credit with a maturity of 0.5 years is considered, the 
resulting minimum capital requirement will be lower than 8%. Finally, the stripped 
area identify the set of PD and LGD such that the minimum capital requirements 
under Basel II are smaller, for maturities of 5 years.  
 
Comparing both charts in Figure 2, we may conclude that as the value of sales 
increases, the set of values of PD and LGD for which the minimum capital 
requirements under Basel II exceed the ones for Basel I also increases. An implication 
of this result is that for the same values of PD and LGD, if a firm with higher sales is 
considered banks may need to hold more capital than under Basel I, whereas if a firm 
with smaller sales is considered, the minimum capital requirement would be smaller 
than under Basel I. The interpretation of this result is that the existence of credit to 
firms with higher sales, which under Basel II could be seen as a proxy for firm size, 
may lead to an increase in risk of bank’s credit portfolio, as banks are concentrating 
their loans in a smaller number of large firms not maximizing diversification gains.  
 
Figure 2 
Comparing capital requirements under Basel I (K
I) and Basel II (K
II) for the corporate 
class 
         Firms reporting sales ≤ € 5 million                 Firms reporting sales ≥ € 50 million 
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As stressed above, the classification of exposures as retail or corporate is crucial for the 
level of capital requirements. Moreover, two additional features concerning this 
classification should be emphasized. This is of extreme importance for firms with 
annual sales smaller than €5 million and credit exposure of about €1 million, as they 
are on the edge of being classified as retail or corporate.The first feature concerns the 
discontinuity in capital requirements when one exposure changes from the retail class 
to the corporate class, or vice-versa, as different risk functions are used. The second 
feature concerns the different sensitivity of capital requirements to the probability of 
default.  
 
The above mentioned discontinuity in the minimum capital requirements, when credit 
moves from the retail portfolio to the corporate class, results from the characteristics of 
the different risk functions established in the Accord. This non negligible discontinuity 
in the capital requirement is generally positive and increases with the loss given default 
as well as the sales level of the firm and the maturity of the credit. For values of the 
parameters reported in the literature (loss given default of 50% and probability of 
default of 2%), maturity of 2.5 years and sales of €5 million, capital requirements can 
be either 5.2% or 8.3% depending on the exposure being classified as retail or corporate, 
as illustrated on the left hand side of Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 
Changing from retail to corporate class 





































































Notes: On the left panel, an LGD of 50%, a PD of 2%, a maturity of 2.5 and annual sales 
smaller than or equal to 5 million euros are considered. On the right panel, an LGD of 50% is 
considered.  
   14
This example illustrates the importance of an adequate classification of exposures, as 
pricing decisions should be closely related to capital requirements. For instance, for the 
same level of sales and maturity of the exposure, a credit below the one-million euro 
threshold has a lower capital requirement, which can be passed through to costumers 
via more competitive loan pricing or simply by adding to the profit margin of the bank. 
As such, certain concerns may arise about the proper operation of a “level playing field” 
and / or undercapitalization of some banks based on its capacity to correctly classify 
the exposures to non-financial firms.  
 
However, we should stress that for some combinations of the maturity of the credit and 
probability of default it is possible that when moving from retail class to corporate 
class capital requirements could decrease, once again in a discontinuous way. However, 
this can only be observed for a limited set of the risk parameters. For instance, for an 
LGD of 50%, this situation is only conceivable for small values of sales, maturities 
smaller than six months and probabilities of default smaller than 0.3%, as illustrated on 
the right-hand side of Figure 3. For each level of sales the area above the line 
represents the combinations of maturity and probability of default such that a 
movement from the retail to the corporate class will lead to an increase in the capital 
requirements.  
 
The second feature concerns the different sensitivity of capital requirements to the 
probability of default. For instance, for an LGD of 50% and a maturity of 2.5 years, if 
retail exposures are being considered an increase in the probability of default from 3% 
to 5% leads to an increase in the minimum capital requirements of 0.3%. If the 
corporate class is being considered this increase can go up to 3.1%. On the left panel of 
Figure 4 it is presented the minimum capital requirements considering a maturity of 
credit of two and a half years and an LGD of 50%. The different sensitivity, measured 
by the slope of the risk weighted function, is plotted on the right panel of Figure 4, 
considering an LGD of 50%. Among all credit classes, the retail class is the one for 
which capital requirements exhibit the smallest sensitivity for a given change in the 
probability of default. In fact, for a wide range of values for the probability of default, 
a change in one percentage point in the probability of default will result in a change 
smaller than 0.5 percentage points in the minimum capital requirements. The 
sensitivity of the minimum capital requirements for the corporate class is also 
dependent on the values of sales and maturity. LGD was assumed to be 50% for   15
simplification matters because the assumed value does not change the nature of the 
results, as minimum capital requirements are multiplicative on the level of LGD. 
 
Figure 4 
The sensitivity of capital requirements to the probability of default 

























































































Notes: It is assumed a maturity of 2.5 years and an LGD of 50%.  
 
 
3.  Characterization of Loans to Portuguese Firms and their Rates of Default 
 
This section presents a characterization of loans to Portuguese firms and their rates of 
default. It begins with a characterization of loans in December 2007 followed by a 
description of default rates in 2008, taking a definition of default in line with the one 
established in the Basel II Accord.  
 
3.1 Loans to firms 
 
The following analysis relies mostly on a Credit Register dataset managed by Banco de 
Portugal (Central de Responsabilidades de Crédito). This brings together information 
provided by all credit institutions operating in Portugal. The dataset collates monthly 
information on all loans granted to non-financial corporations, as well as credit lines, 
with an amount outstanding higher than 50 euros.
13 The information on loans is 
categorized by type of loan and this allows for a decomposition into short-term loans 
(loans with a maturity lower than one year), medium and long-term loans (loans with a 
maturity higher than one year), others (loans for which the maturity is not specified), 
                                                  
13 Although not considered in this study, this data set also contains information on loans 
granted to households, public administration and non-incorporated business, as well as 
information on securitized operations.  
Capital requirements   Change in capital requirements (measured in 
p.p.) for a change of 1 p.p in the probability of 
default   16
overdue loans and unused credit lines.
14 The additional data for this work comes from 
the Central Balance Sheet Database (Central de Balanços), providing the information 
on annual sales necessary to calibrate the corporate function specified in equation (1). 
The starting point of the exercise was the credit portfolio of firms in December 2007, 
stratified according to the level of annual sales for the year 2007. Annual sales for 2006 
were taken whenever the value for 2007 was missing in the database. After combining 
these databases, the sample for December 2007 has around 400 000 observations, i.e., 
credit exposures to non-financial firms, corresponding to about 230 000 firms.  
 
In Portugal in December 2007, 201 financial institutions from more than 20 financial 
groups were reporting to the Credit Register. Out of the 201 financial institutions, 55 
do not belong to any financial group and 102 financial institutions belong to the 
SICAM, the Portuguese agricultural savings’ banking group. This group, although 
being the largest in terms of the number of financial institutions, grants less than 3% of 
the outstanding loans to firms. The five major financial groups operating in Portugal 
grant more than 68% of the total outstanding loans to firms. 
 
In order to characterize loans to firms we begin by decomposing them in the following 
categories: short-term loans, medium and long-term loans, overdue loans, unused credit 
lines, and other loans. Short-term loans have a maturity smaller than one year and 
medium and long-term loans have a maturity higher than one year. This decomposition 
which is presented for the Portuguese banking system as a whole also studies the 
heterogeneity exhibited across financial groups
15. Figure 5 reports the information for 
the Portuguese banking system on the left-hand-side while the decomposition of the 
total loans across financial groups is reported on the right-hand side. The values 
reported on the right-hand side of Figure 5 are percentiles 5, 25, 75 and 95. Medium 
and long-term loans have the largest share in the Portuguese banking system, 
representing more than 50% of total loans, as reported on the left hand side of Figure 
5. A similar conclusion is obtained when considering each financial group individually. 
In fact, for the median institution the medium-long term debt represents 50% of firms’ 
total loans and short-term loans represent 28% of firms’ total loans. Using the 
difference between the percentiles 5 and 95 as a simple measure of heterogeneity across 
                                                  
14 The short term loans further breakdown into commercial liabilities, finance at discount and 
other short term liabilities. In addition, it is possible to identify the portion of overdue loans 
which are under litigation.  
15 If an institution does not belong to a financial group it is labelled as a financial group itself, 
resulting in a total of 79 financial groups.   17
financial groups, it is possible to say that there is more heterogeneity across financial 
groups for medium and long-term credit than for the other categories. Notice that the 
residual category “other” is not graphed across financial groups due to its very small 
dimension for all groups.  
 
Figure 5 
Decomposition of the total loans to firms, as of December 2007 
























Note: The residual category “other” is not depicted on the right-hand side of the figure because of its very 
small dimension. The values depicted on the right-hand side of the figure correspond to percentiles 5, 25, 
75 and 95. The analysis is performed across 79 financial groups. 
 
Total loans can also be decomposed according to the exposure size. As discussed in 
several Banco de Portugal Financial Stability Reports (e.g. Banco de Portugal (2007)), 
the credit portfolio of the Portuguese banking system is “highly concentrated on large 
firms”, where the size of the firm is proxied by the size of its total credit. In fact, it is 
observed that only 4% of the total number of exposures is higher than one million 
euros, corresponding to 71% of the total amount of credit. Figure 6 illustrates the 
degree of concentration of loans. The concentration observed on exposures larger than 
one million euros is still more evident if the size of the total credit per firm is 
considered, instead of the exposure size to a given banking group. In this case, it is 
observed that 80% of the outstanding amount of credit corresponds to liabilities of 
firms whose total credit is over one million euros. Moreover, these firms correspond to 
6% of the total number of firms with outstanding banking credit
16. Results are similar if 
securitized operations are considered. The degree of concentration of credit is a risk 
element also deserving particular attention for a macro-prudential analysis of the 




                                                  
16 For a discussion on this topic see Banco de Portugal (2007).   18
Figure 6 
































For the purpose of computing minimum capital requirements, it is important to 
consider not only the exposure size but also the level of firms’ annual sales which, 
following Basel II, is taken as a proxy for the size of firms. Under the IRB approach for 
corporate credits, banks are allowed to distinguish between exposures to small and 
medium size firms (SMEs) and those to large firms. SMEs are defined here as firms 
with reported annual sales smaller than €50 million. Loans extended to SMEs can then 
be divided into three classes according to the amount of credit granted and annual 
sales: retail exposure, as long as the total exposure to the banking group is smaller than 
€1 million, and two other corporate categories, as long as the total exposure is higher 
than €1 million, for different levels of sales. Summing up, the four classes in which the 
total credit is divided are as follows: 
1.  the SME_Retail class, which includes credits smaller than one million euros to 
firms with annual sales smaller than 50 million euros,
17 
2.  the SME_1 class, which includes credits higher than one million euros to firms 
with annual sales smaller than 5 million euros;  
3.  the SME_2 class, which includes credits higher than one million euros to firms 
with annual sales between 5 and 50 million euros; 
4.  and the Corporate class, which includes credits of any size to firms with annual 
sales higher than 50 millions euros.    
 
                                                  
17 There are other conditions that credits must follow to be considered as retail exposures. For 
instance, the retail portfolio must follow the so-called “granularity criterion”, that is, it needs to 
be “sufficiently diversified to reduce risks”, which may imply the setting of limits to aggregate 
exposures to one counterparty.   19
According to this decomposition,
18 most loans are granted to SMEs, where the retail is 
the most representative class (see the left hand side of Figure 7). Loans to firms with 
more than €50 million of annual sales account for 10% of total credit to firms. On the 
right-hand side of Figure 7 the same information is presented across financial groups. 
The heterogeneity across financial groups is higher for the loans granted to the smallest 
type of firms. In fact, it is observed that, for the retail class, the percentile 25 of the 
distribution is 22% and the percentile 75 is 35% implying that for the middle 50% 
institutions, the weight of the retail class ranges between 22 and 35% of their total 
loans to firms. The difference between percentiles 25 and 75 is smaller for the other 
credit classes. In addition, for 5% of the institutions the retail class represents more 
than 84% of their total loans to firms. There is also some heterogeneity in the corporate 
class of credit. For instance, for the lower 5% of institutions the corporate class 
represents less than 4% of their loans to firms while, for the top 5% of institutions it 
represents more than 40%. The analogous values for the SME_1 and SME_2 credit 
classes are less wide. The exposures for which there is no information on sales are 
dispersed among the financial groups representing, on average, 22% of the loans of each 
financial group.  
 
Figure 7 
Decomposition of loans to firms by corporate class, as of December 2007 






















Note: The "No information" class refers to loans to firms for which data on annual sales is not available. 
Unused credit lines are excluded. The values depicted on the right-hand side of the figure correspond to 
percentiles 5, 25, 75 and 95. The analysis is performed across 79 financial groups. 
 
Table 1 presents a decomposition of loans by corporate class and maturity, excluding 
unused credit lines. This table also decomposes loans overdue across credit classes. As 
                                                  
18 Only 78.5% of total loans are allocated by credit class, as there is no information available on 
annual sales for the remaining. Sales reported as null were not considered. Saurina and 
Trucharte (2004), where eight years of data are considered, have an average exposure coverage 
of 73.9%.    20
already mentioned, most loans have a maturity higher than one year. The debt 
maturity pattern is the same for those loans where a credit class can not be allocated 
due to the lack of information on annual sales, as these loans are mainly medium and 
long-term credit. Regarding the observed overdue in December 2007, it is concentrated 
on firms for which it is not possible to obtain information on sales. In any case, these 
firms will be excluded from the calculation of capital requirements, which assumes the 
ex-ante full coverage of overdue loans by provisions. 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of loans by corporate class and maturity 
(as a percentage of total loans) 
SME_retail SME_1 SME_2 Corporate No information Total
medium and 
long-term
13.4% 17.0% 13.9% 6.5% 15.2% 66.0%
short-term 11.4% 5.6% 6.7% 3.6% 5.1% 32.4%
overdue 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 1.6%
Total 25.0% 22.7% 20.7% 10.1% 21.5% 100.0%
 
Note: unused credit lines are excluded. The residual category “other” is assumed to have medium 
and long-term maturity.   
 
Finally, a decomposition of loans by corporate class and industry is presented. The 
industry is not a risk component as defined in Basel II but there are two main reasons 
to proceed with this characterization. First, the concentration of the Portuguese 
banking system in a few economic activity sectors, namely construction and real estate, 
is a persistent fact which has been reported in the Banco de Portugal Financial 
Stability Report (e.g. Banco de Portugal (2007)) for the last few years. The 
concentration in the real estate sector is even more severe if mortgage loans are 
considered, as they account for about 45% of the total loans of the Portuguese banking 
system to the non-financial sectors. Nevertheless, this fact has not been considered a 
serious vulnerability of the Portuguese financial system, since mortgage loans tend to 
have lower risk, as they are secured by property and real estate prices in Portugal are 
not believed to be overvalued as they are in some other European countries. The 
second reason to proceed with this characterization is related to the estimation of the 
probability of default of exposures (to be done in the next subsection) as, in an attempt 
to construct homogenous portfolios, a segmentation per economic sector is conducted. 
 
As expected, in December 2007, loans to firms belonging to the real estate and 
construction sectors represented the major share of total loans, accounting for more 
than 38% of total loans to firms (see Table 2). In addition, these firms are mostly   21
classified in the SMEs classes. In fact, the retail and the SME_1 are the most 
important classes for almost all economic sectors. Finally, it is not possible to 
characterize in terms of annual sales almost half of the loans granted to firms in the 
“other services provided to firms” sector, and this is, in fact, a drawback for our 




Distribution of loans by corporate class and economic sector 
(as a percentage of total loans) 
SME_retail SME_1 SME_2 Corporate No information Total
Construction 4.3% 6.4% 3.6% 1.9% 3.3% 19.5%
Real estate 1.9% 6.9% 4.6% 0.7% 5.3% 19.4%
Whol. retail trade 7.5% 1.2% 2.4% 1.7% 2.2% 14.9%
Other services provided to firms 1.4% 4.3% 0.8% 0.9% 7.0% 14.4%
Manufacturing 5.4% 1.0% 3.5% 1.9% 1.4% 13.2%
Other services 1.5% 0.8% 1.6% 0.9% 1.1% 5.8%
Transport 1.0% 0.4% 2.3% 1.7% 0.2% 5.6%
Other economic sectors 1.8% 1.8% 1.9% 0.5% 1.2% 7.3%
No economic sector 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
 
Notes: The category "Other economic sectors" includes economic sectors representing less than 
4% of the total loans to firms; the "No economic sector" refers to loans to firms not possible to 
characterize in terms of economic sector. Unused credit lines are excluded. 
 
Summing up, in December 2007, the majority of firms’ loans obtained through the 
Portuguese banking system were characterized by having a maturity higher than one 
year and being concentrated in five large financial groups. In addition, about 25% of 
loans to firms could be recognized as retail exposure, and more than 38% of total loans 
to firms were granted to firms in real estate and construction sectors.  
 
3.2. The rate of default 
 
The following section presents a characterization of the observed rate of default of the 
Portuguese non-financial firms over the year 2008. The definition of default used is in 
line with the one in Basel II. In that context, for a financial group, an exposure is 
considered to be in default whenever the firm is overdue more than 500 euros (loans 
reported either as overdue loans or loans under litigation) over three consecutive 
months. For the assessment of the default rate over 2008 only exposures in December 
2007 that did not exhibit default over 2007 will be considered. 
 
The heterogeneity of loans among economic sectors motivates a first characterization of 
the rate of default by economic sector. The highest rate of default is observed in   22
exposures to firms in the construction sector, while the smallest are in exposures to 
firms in agriculture and fishing. This information is presented in Figure 8, where the 
horizontal axis represents the median exposure of each industry. The area of each 
bubble is proportional to the number of exposures in each industry.  
 
Figure 8 
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Note: Utilities include gas, electricity, water, post and telecommunications. The default rate 
corresponds to the number of exposures exhibiting default in 2008 over the total number of 
exposures in a given economic sector. 
 
A possible relationship between the observed rate of default and the size of the firm is 
also explored, as the literature documents this relationship in other countries. This 
analysis will be performed taking annual sales as proxy for the firm size. The absence of 
information on the economic sector and sales for some exposures results in the 
exclusion of 12.3% of reported exposures, corresponding to 20% of loans.
19 This 
reduction in the sample size creates a bias, as observations not considered correspond 
to firms with higher default rate. Then, in the sample finally used, 3.6% of the number 
of exposures exhibited default in 2008. The proportion of amount of loans exhibiting 
default is also 3.6%.
20 
 
Table  3 presents a characterization of the rate of default of the financial group 
exposures for different classes of firms’ sales as well as the exposure level. The default 
rate corresponds to the number of exposures exhibiting default in 2008 over the number 
                                                  
19 Notice that this number is lower than the one presented in Figure 5, as only loans of firms 
that did not default during 2007 are considered. The same applies for the remaining analysis. 
20 If all the data was considered, 4.8 % of the exposures reported in December 2007 would 
exhibit default in 2008, while the proportion of the amount of those loans exhibiting default 
would only be 4.1% of the total amount of loans.   23
of exposures in a given combination of firm’s sales and exposure size. Moreover, the 
number of exposures over the total number of exposures as well as the amount of loans 










6 1M - 10M > 10M
Default rate 2.6% 4.3% 4.6% 6.4% 6.2% 3.9%
% exposures 28.8% 44.2% 16.9% 1.9% 0.1% 91.9%
% loans 0.4% 6.2% 18.6% 17.6% 10.9% 53.8%
Default rate 0.4% 0.9% 1.4% 2.3% 2.2% 1.4%
% exposures 0.8% 1.4% 3.7% 1.3% 0.1% 7.4%
% loans 0.0% 0.2% 5.9% 12.7% 14.1% 33.0%
Default rate 0.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 0.6%
% exposures 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.8%
% loans 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 3.8% 9.1% 13.3%
Default rate 2.6% 4.1% 4.0% 4.4% 3.4% 3.6%
% exposures 29.7% 45.7% 20.8% 3.5% 0.3% 100.0%















 5M - 50M
> 50M
 
Note: The default rate corresponds to the number of exposures exhibiting default in 2008 over 
the total number of exposures for a given combination of firms’ sales and exposure size. 
 
As can be observed, the rate of default decreases with the firms’ sales. Hence, taking 
firms’ sales as a proxy for the firms’ size we can say that larger firms exhibit lower rate 
of default on their loans. This is in line with Dietsch and Petey (2004) and Jacobson, 
Lindé and Roszbach (2005), among others, who have also reported similar evidence in 
different countries. In terms of the relationship between the observed rate of default 
and the size of the exposure, for the adopted classes of exposure, the highest default 
rate is observed for exposures between one and ten million euros. The smallest default 
rates are observed for exposures smaller than ten thousand euros and higher than ten 
million euros. Credit exposures higher than ten million euros, although caused by only 
0.3% of the total number of exposures, correspond to 34.1% of total credit. The 
relationship between the observed rate of default and the size of the exposure still holds 
if the overall sample is considered. In addition, default rates would increase, confirming 
the bias of our sample towards better creditors and reinforcing the importance of 
conducting robustness tests with the entire dataset. 
 
In Table 4 information on the rate of default, the number of the exposures as well as 
the size of the exposures is also reported as per the four classes of credit previously 
described. The adoption of this classification, in line with Basel II, results in an 
asymmetric distribution of loans with a clear concentration in the retail class, as   24
already shown in Figure 7 for all firms. In fact, the retail class includes 95.8% of the 
number of credit exposures and accounts for 31.7% of total loans. The highest rate of 
default is observed for exposures classified as SME_1. Over and against this, the 
corporate class presents the lowest default rate. This class, although originated by only 
0.8% of the number of exposures, accounts for 13.3% of the total amount of loans  
 
Table 4 
The default rate in Portuguese firms in 2008 by credit class 
SME_retail SME_1 SME_2 Corporate
Exposure <1M >1M >1M
Sales < 50M < 5M 5M - 50M > 50M
Default rate 3.6% 6.5% 2.3% 0.6%
% exposures 95.8% 2.0% 1.4% 0.8%
% loans 31.7% 28.3% 26.7% 13.3%  
Note: The default rate corresponds to the number of exposures exhibiting default in 2008 over 
the total number of exposures belonging to a given credit class. 
 
 
4. Capital requirements for the Portuguese banking system 
 
This section assesses the implications on capital requirements driven by firms’ credit 
risk for Portuguese banks, if the IRB methodology had been adopted in 2007. We begin 
by presenting the results on capital requirements for the Portuguese banking system 
concerning firms’ credit risk. Robustness tests on this analysis are also performed. This 
is then followed by a comparison between the results on capital requirements at 
December 2007 and similar estimates at December 2006. 
 
4.1 Capital requirements  
 
The assessment of capital requirements concerning firms’ credit risk is carried out using 
the observed rate of default in 2008, described in the previous section, as a proxy for 
the probability of default. For each class of credit and for each economic sector a 
different probability of default is assigned,
21 in line with the fact that in 2008 the rates 
of default exhibit heterogeneous behavior across these two dimensions. Capital 
requirements are then aggregated using as weights the proportion of the amount of 
loans in the total portfolio.  
                                                  
21 For some economic activity sectors and some classes of credit the observed default rate in 
2008 is 0%. In these cases, and following Basel II, we take the probability of default to be 
0.03%.   25
 
As described in section 2 (see equations (1) and (2)) the computation of capital 
requirements under Basel II involves the knowledge of other risk components regarding 
each credit exposure, among them the maturity of the credit and the loss given default. 
In terms of credit maturity, a maturity of half a year for the short term and a maturity 
of two years and a half for the long term is used. At a later stage, simulations with 
different maturities are also performed.
22 In reference to the loss given default, we first 
take as benchmark the values 45% and 75%, as discussed in Section 2. These bounds 
for the LGD are in line with the results of Fernandes (2006), where data from a 
Portuguese commercial bank gives an average recovery rate of 48.6%. However, using 
data over the period 1995-2000 from a different Portuguese commercial bank, Dermine 
and Neto de Carvalho (2006) concluded the mean cumulative recovery rate to be 71%. 
Additionally, using a more comprehensive data set, covering credit information 
reported by Portuguese financial institutions over the period between 1995 and 2001, 
Antunes (2005) concludes that a rough estimate of the LGD would be 46%. Finally, the 
results of the fifth quantitative impact study (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(2006a)) show that LGDs in the corporate portfolio range between 29.1% and 56.3% 
(the average being 39.8%), while for the SME corporate portfolio, the average LGD for 
G10 largest banks is 35.0%, but values range from 16.3% to 54.5%. Given the 
previously mentioned studies, the Basel II Accord benchmarks and the absence of 
information on risk mitigation, several simulations for different values of LGD were 
carried out.  
 
Capital requirements for each financial group are computed as a weighted average of 
the capital requirements of each credit exposure, where the weights are the ratio of 
each exposure at default over the total exposure at default in the financial group. The 
exposure at default includes short-term loans, medium and long-term loans as well as 
loans labeled as other. As a conservative scenario, these other loans, where there is no 
information on maturity, were considered as long-term.  
 
The characterization of capital requirements for the Portuguese banking system begins 
by analyzing the heterogeneity across financial groups operating in Portugal.
23 This 
                                                  
22 The simulated values for the long-term maturity are restricted as Basel II defines the 
maximum maturity to be 5 years. 
23 Capital requirements for each financial group are calculated as a weighted average of capital 
requirements of each exposure, where the weights are the ratio of the amount of each exposure 
to the total amount of loans of that financial group. Note that capital requirements of each   26
analysis is carried out using empirical distributions obtained by recourse to a Gaussian 
kernel that weights financial groups by their total loans to firms, with results being 
reported in Figure 9. This analysis is performed for different values of LGD and 
maturity of exposures. Regarding the LGD, the values 45% and 75% were considered. 
For maturity three different scenarios were used: a short-term maturity of 0.2 years 
and a long-term maturity of 1.5 years; a short-term maturity of 0.5 years and a long-
term maturity of 2.5 years; and a short-term maturity of 0.8 years and a long-term 
maturity of 4.5 years.  
 
Figure 9 
Empirical distribution of capital requirements for different maturities of the exposures 
and LGD, across financial groups 
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19%
Minimum capital requirements
LGD=0.45
Mst = 0.2; Mlt = 1.5
Mst = 0.5; Mlt = 2.5
Mst = 0.8; Mlt = 4.5
LGD=0.75
Mst = 0.2; Mlt = 1.5
Mst = 0.5; Mlt = 2.5
Mst = 0.8; Mlt = 4.5
 
Note: Empirical distribution obtained by recourse to a Gaussian kernel that weights institutions 
by loans to firms. 
 
As expected, capital requirements increase with the LGD and the effective maturity of 
the exposures. The LGD assumption proves to be crucial to the determination of 
capital requirements. For an LGD of 45%, capital requirements for firms’ credit risk is 
lower than 8% for most institutions while the opposite happens for an LGD of 75%. It 
is observed that the heterogeneity across banks increases with the LGD value and with 
the maturity of exposures. As LGD increases, capital requirements exhibit higher 
dispersion as its level is more sensitive to the composition of each financial group’s 
loans across credit classes. An analogous conclusion can be made concerning the 
average maturities.  
 
We now proceed with the analysis of capital requirements for the Portuguese banking 
system, weighting each financial group by its total amount of loans to non financial 
                                                                                                                                            
exposure depends on the amount of the exposure, maturity, annual sales, and economic sector. 
The influence of the economic sector on capital requirements results from the fact that the PD, 
which is an input of the risk weight function, may be different across economic sectors.    27
firms. The analysis is carried out by decomposing total loans into the credit classes 
previously defined and according to the maturity of exposures. Results show that 
capital requirements driven by firms’ credit risk for the banking system will be lower 
than the ones under Basel I as long as the LGD is assumed to be lower than 52% (see 
Figure 10). The corporate and retail classes are those that have smaller capital 
requirements, for any level of LGD. In the case of the retail class, although it presents 
a high probability of default, the functional form of the risk weight function induces 
this result. In the corporate case, although the functional form of the risk weight 
function would lead to the highest capital requirements among different classes 
(everything else the same), its lowest probability of default induces the result. On the 
subject of exposures to SMEs, it should be stressed that capital requirements for 
exposures higher than 1M euros and sales smaller than 5M are above those of the 
overall banking system, while capital requirements for the other two SME classes are 
below. Capital requirements of the SME_2 class are below the ones for the SME_1 
because the probability of default is much lower, although the risk weight function is 
more demanding. In a comparison of the SME_1 class with the SME_retail class, the 
fact that capital requirements are smaller for the retail results from the fact that the 
risk weight function is less demanding and the probability of default is lower. This 
corroborates the results presented in Section 2 concerning the importance of an 
exposure classification. In short, if the probabilities of default were the same for all 
classes, capital requirements for firms classified as corporate would be higher than those 
for the SME_2, which in turn would be higher than those for SME_1. However, as 
presented in Figure 10, this is not observed because of the heterogeneous probabilities 
of default. In particular, the probability of default of the corporate class is so much 
smaller than the retail one that capital requirements turn out to be similar. Figure 10 
also illustrates the fact that errors due to incorrect classification increase with higher 
levels of LGD. In terms of the decomposition of capital requirements according to the 
maturity of exposure, which is not a relevant risk driver for capital requirements of 
retail exposures, longer-term maturities result in higher capital requirements, as 
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Figure 10 
Capital requirements of the banking system: by credit class and maturity 
Notes: The maturity of short-term loans was assumed to be 0.5 years while the 
maturity of long-term loans was assumed to be 2.5 years. 
 
4.2 Robustness analysis  
 
As a robustness test of the Portuguese banking system capital requirements for firms’ 
credit risk, we assess the implications of the postulated maturities of the exposures, the 
exclusion of the exposures for which there is no available information on annual sales 
and the use of different probabilities of default. Hence, the first robustness check 
concerns the maturity of exposures. If the short-term maturity is assumed to be 0.2 
years and the long-term maturity is assumed to be 1.5 years, the recovery rate higher 
than 44% assures that capital requirements under Basel II are lower than those under 
Basel I (see left panel of Figure 11). On the other hand, assuming a short-term 
maturity of 0.8 years and a long-term maturity of 4.5 years, capital requirements under 
Basel II are lower than those under Basel I if the recovery rate is higher than 53%. As 
previously mentioned, this value for the recovery rate is in line with previous studies on 
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Figure 11 
Robustness analysis of capital requirements of the banking system 
Note: The maturity of short-term loans was assumed to be 0.5 years while the maturity 
of long-term loans was assumed to be 2.5 years for the right hand side panel. 
 
 
The second robustness check concerns the bias of the sample towards better creditors, 
which is a drawback of the previous analysis. In this context, the exposures with no 
information available were divided into two groups, as a function of exposure size. The 
exposures smaller than 1 million euros were classified as “retail”
 24 (around 3% of total 
loans), while all the others were classified as “corporate” (around 17% of total loans), 
the most conservative scenario for exposures higher than 1M euros. The probability of 
default assigned to these exposures was, once again, the observed rate of default over 
2008. For exposures smaller than 1M euros, the observed rate of default is 13.6%. For 
exposures higher than 1M euros the observed rate is 9.7%, which is much higher than 
the rate observed for exposures initially classified as corporate. In this scenario, capital 
requirements for firms’ credit risk in the banking system remain below those under 
Basel I only if the recovery rate is assumed to be around or higher than 60% (see right 
panel of Figure 11). Moreover, the consideration of these exposures causes a higher 
sensitivity of capital requirements with respect to the LGD. 
 
The third robustness check concerns the use of different probabilities of default, namely 
the consideration of a single probability of default per different homogeneous groups of 
exposures and a single probability of default for the whole system. The reason 
                                                  
24 This classification is not the most conservative as firms with sales higher than 50M euros may 
have exposures lower than 1M euros. In such cases, exposures lower than 1M euros would be 
wrongly categorized as retail. However, this situation was not contemplated as for firms that did 
not exhibit default over 2007 and with information available on sales for the year 2007, only 
1.3% of the loans lower than 1M euros was caused by firms with sales higher than 50M. Hence, 
given the impossibility of classifying as retail or corporate the exposures smaller than 1M euros, 
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underlying this robustness test is the potential error of grouping heterogeneous 
exposures and assigning them the same probability of default, as the risk weight 
functions are concave on the probability of default (see Figure 4). In this context, using 
as proxy for the probability of default the observed rate of default calculated for 
different homogeneous groups, the impact on the minimum capital requirements is 
assessed. The homogeneous groups considered are: i) per economic sector and exposure 
size; ii) per sales level and exposure size and iii) per economic sector. The exposure size 
classes, as well as the level of sales classes, are as defined in Table 3. Comparing with 
the baseline case presented in section 4.1, the highest difference in capital requirements 
is observed if default rates are uniform for exposures in the same economic sector. An 
increase of 1.33 p.p. in the level of capital requirements is observed if an LGD of 50% is 
considered. The use of a single rate of default per sales level and exposure size results in 
the lowest change of around 0.7 p.p. in capital requirements (for an LGD of 50%). 
These results stress the importance of stratifying adequately the portfolio of loans to 
non-financial firms into homogeneous groups for the purpose of computing capital 
requirements. 
 
Then, we assessed the impact on capital requirements of using a single rate of default 
for the whole economy. As an example of the potential error which may arise when 
grouping heterogeneous exposures assigning them the same probability of default, 
consider an economy with only two exposures. The exposure to firm A has a 
probability of default PDA and the exposure to firm B has a probability of default PDB. 
The proportion of the exposure at default of firm A is wA, while the proportion of the 
exposure at default of firm B is wB. According to Basel II the probability of default 
should be computed for each homogeneous group, the minimum capital requirements is 
given by K(PDA,PDB) = wA K(PDA) + wB K(PDB). However, if a single probability of 
default is assigned to both firms (PD), the resulting minimum capital requirements will 
be K(PD). Hence, the use of a unique probability of default results in an error defined 
as K(PDA,PDB) - K(PD). Considering a unique PD defined as the weighted average of 
the probability of default of each firm (that is, PD = wA PDA + wB PDB), results in 
minimum capital requirements higher than the ones established under Basel II, as the 
risk weight function is concave on the probability of default. Moreover, different 
probabilities will result in different errors. If a probability of default higher than the 
weighted average is assigned, the error would have the same sign and would be even 
larger. If a lower probability of default is assigned either the error is of the same sign 
but smaller, or it becomes negative with a magnitude dependent on the probability of   31
default assigned. The errors on the minimum capital requirements resulting from using 
a single rate of default within a group are minimized if firms are homogenous in what 
concerns their probability of default. In this context, instead of using different 
probabilities of default a single probability of default is used, resulting in higher 
minimum capital requirements. Using a probability of default of 3.6% (as pointed in 
section 3.2) the minimum capital requirements for firms’ credit risk will exhibit an 
increase of 1.1 percentage points, for an LGD of 50%. Hence, the use of a single 
probability of default, which is not in line with Basel II fundamentals, introduces a non 
negligible error. 
 
4.3 Time-consistency of capital requirements  
 
Using the same approach, capital requirements driven by firms’ credit risk for the 
Portuguese banking system were also computed for December 2006, in which case the 
observed rate of default in 2007 was used as a proxy for the probability of default. The 
comparison of capital requirements for two consecutive years allows a decomposition of 
its change into two important components, namely, changes in the composition of 
credit portfolio and changes in the probability of default. In our data, it is observed a 
relevant increase in default rates, especially in the exposures classified as SME_1, 
resulting in an increase of 0.26 p.p. in capital requirements, for an LGD of 50%. This 
increase can go up to 0.4p.p. if an LGD of 75% is considered.
25 Most of this increase in 
capital requirements (around 85%) is due to an increase in the probability of default. 
This effect results from assessing capital requirements for 2006 using, as proxy for the 
probability of default, the default rate in 2008. The remaining effect (around 15%) can 




The Basel II Accord, which came into force in 2007, establishes new capital adequacy 
rules. In contrast to the previous Accord, this new one seeks a better alignment 
between regulatory capital and economic risk. One of the most important changes is 
the definition of capital requirements for credit risk based on internal risk ratings. 
Banks are permitted to develop internal methodologies to quantify the creditworthiness 
                                                  
25 This increase is underestimated as the proportion of firms with no available information on 
annual sales (which are the firms with the highest probability of default) is higher in 2007 than 
in 2006.   32
of their clients. These methodologies will allow for the computation of two of the most 
important risk components needed for the computation of risk-weighted assets: the 
probability of default and the loss given default. Then, for each credit portfolio, and 
using some additional information, a risk weight function provided by the Basel 
Committee translates these risk components into capital requirements.  
 
This work aims at studying the impact of the adoption of Basel II rules for the 
determination of capital requirements for firms’ credit risk. It starts by establishing 
regions of values for the probability of default and the loss given default for which 
Basel II would be more demanding in terms of capital requirements for firms’ credit 
risk than Basel I. We conclude that capital requirements for exposures classified as 
corporate being higher or lower than the ones under Basel I is dependent on the values 
assumed for the PD and the LGD. On the other hand, for credit to firms classified as 
retail, and for commonly accepted values for PD and LGD, capital requirements are 
below those under Basel I. Our analysis emphasizes the importance of an exposure’s 
classification as retail or corporate.  
 
In Portugal, as expected, most loans are granted to firms with annual sales smaller 
than 50M euros (SMEs), from which less than half are classified as retail exposures. 
The real estate and construction sectors are the economic sectors where loans are more 
concentrated. The majority of the loans have a maturity higher than one year. The 
observed firms’ rate of default in Portugal over the year 2008 presents a differentiated 
pattern across different economic sectors. Construction comes in with the highest 
default rate. Moreover, the observed rate of default decreases with the firms’ size, 
taking the definition of firm size as in the Accord. For the adopted categories of 
exposure size, the observed rate of default is non monotonic, increasing (roughly) with 
the exposure size for exposures smaller than 10M euros (which account for 66% of total 
loans) and decreasing significantly for those higher than that amount (which account 
for 0.3% of the number of exposures and 34% of total loans). 
 
Using the observed rate of default in 2008 as a proxy for the probability of default in 
2007, assessed by economic sector and class of credit as defined in Basel II, capital 
requirements for the Portuguese banking system associated with loans to non-financial 
firms are shown to be lower than the ones under Basel I, for recovery rates higher than 
50%. Among the SMEs, the retail class is the one that exhibits the lowest capital 
requirement, despite having a high rate of default. The corporate class displays very   33
similar capital requirements to the retail class, which can be justified by the fact that it 
exhibits the smallest rate of default. The empirical analysis for Portuguese non-financial 
firms confirms the importance of the allocation of credits among the credit classes 
defined under Basel II. As there is no precise information available for the maturity of 
exposures, different assumptions were made. Under extreme assumptions for maturity if 
a recovery rate of 53% is assumed, capital requirements for firms’ credit risk are still 
lower than those under Basel I. In addition, given the non-existence of information on 
annual sales for all exposures, a robustness check on the inclusion of these observations 
was carried out. Assuming standard values for maturity and a recovery rate of 50%, 
capital requirements for firms’ credit risk will still be smaller than those under Basel I. 
Using a different segmentation for the estimation of the probability of default, an 
increase in capital requirements was observed. In all cases, only a recovery rate of 60% 
assures that capital requirements are still lower than under Basel I. Finally, comparing 
capital requirements for 2006 and 2007, an increase was obtained. The main reason for 
this change was an increase in the probability of default, reflecting the recent 
deterioration of firms’ credit risk. 
 
It should be stressed that our analysis only considers the credit risk of non-financial 
corporations’ loans, leaving aside the remaining loan portfolio, among which are 
mortgage loans. Market and operational risk are not assessed at all in this study. The 
treatment of mortgage loans is of extreme importance for the assessment of capital 
requirements in the Portuguese banking system, as mortgage loans represent around 
half of the total credit granted by banks. We believe that the inclusion of mortgage 
loans would result in lower capital requirements, given that these credits have collateral 
(resulting in lower LGD) and are classified as retail. On the other hand, the capital 
charge for operational risk would add up a non-negligible amount to capital 
requirements presented in this work.   34
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